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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Background to the study  
In today’s world, one factor that is affecting negatively the lives of millions is 
corruption.1 Although there is no single, comprehensive and universally accepted 
definition of corruption,2 it may be defined fruitfully as “the abuse or complicity in the 
abuse of private or public power, office or resources for personal gain”. 3      
Over the last few decades, corruption has thrived despite efforts to eliminate it. 
Current reports on corrupt activities in the media all over the world show that 
corruption affects all types of nations, from industrialised, to poor, to transitional.4 It 
mostly flourishes in countries where a culture of transparency and accountability is 
lacking; where democratic institutions have been compromised; where market 
participants do not operate under an internationally accepted set of standards; and 
where the rule of law has ceased to exist.5  
                                                            
1 According to Bantekas (2006: 484) corruption in the developing world, in particular, is a driving force 
of famine, civil war and poverty. See also Carr (2006: 44).  
2 International and regional anti-corruption instruments, instead of formulating one workable definition, 
provide a list of criminal offences and conduct that amounts to corruption, which list includes bribery, 
embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, and laundering of proceeds 
of crime. See Articles 15-24 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (hereafter UNCAC) 
(adopted in 2003 and entered into force 14 December 2005), and Article 14 of the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (hereafter AU Convention) (adopted in 2003 and 
entered into force 05 August 2006).   
3 Chinhamo & Shumba (2007: 1). 
4 See Harms (2000: 161). According to Ampratwum (2008: 76-77) former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, while reporting to the General Assembly, charged that: “this evil phenomenon is found in all 
countries, rich and poor. The United States, despite its wealth, democracy, and elaborate system of 
justice, has been experiencing a troubling bout of financial fraud. Corruption, however, hits the poor 
countries especially hard by diverting money away from development”.  
5 Kofele-Kale (2006: 698-699).   
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The mid-1990s saw a flurry of activity on the international front, with a number of 
organisations issuing declarations and setting up committees to address the problem 
through international instruments.6 In addition, most States have implemented anti-
corruption measures within their national systems, including the adoption of a range 
of policies to improve public administration, economic reforms, political reforms, legal 
and judicial reforms, and other institutional reforms.7 Among the efforts made by 
States is the establishment of institutions whose major purpose is to prevent and/or 
combat corruption.8 Although entrusted with a very critical task, in most cases these 
institutions have not been effective in accomplishing what they were established to 
do, principally due to structural flaws, political interference, and lack of sufficient 
powers and political will.      
Ethiopia has followed the trend of creating specialised anti-corruption institutions by 
establishing a commission whose primary objective is preventing and fighting 
corruption.9 The establishment of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (FEACC) was motivated by the belief that corruption and impropriety 
are capable of hindering the social, economic and political development of the 
country.10 And establishing the Commission was the right way to go about 
addressing the threat posed by corruption. This paper explores the strengths and 
flaws of the Commission, and the contribution made by it in the overall anti-corruption 
strategy of the country.           
 
                                                            
6 See Carr (2005: 24).            
7 See Shihata (1997: 464-469).  
8 See Heilbrunn (2004: 1).   
9 See Preamble paragraph 3 of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishing 
Proclamation no. 433/2005 (hereafter Revised Establishing Proclamation),  
10 See Preamble paragraph 1 of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
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1.2   Objectives of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance and effectiveness of 
institutional support in the fight against corruption in Ethiopia, with special emphasis 
on the FEACC. The success of an anti-corruption commission or agency depends on 
a number of factors. Among them are political will and broad political support, 
operational independence and freedom from political interference, high standards of 
integrity among the institution’s leaders and staff, and public awareness of and 
confidence in the commission’s or agency’s mission.11 How is the FEACC set up with 
regard to its operational independence? How is the Commissioner, the nominal head 
of the Commission, appointed to and removed from office? How much is the public 
aware of the Commission and how confident is it in the Commission? An attempt is 
made to answer these and other similar questions.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the mission of the Commission and its 
capacity to discharge that mission will be scrutinised.   
In addition, best standards for anti-corruption corruption institutions will be examined, 
in an attempt to deduce good practice and make recommendations about the 
operations and practices of the FEACC. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 See Doig et al (2005: 12).  
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1.3   Significance of the study 
Among other things, corruption lowers investment and retards economic growth, 
reduces the effectiveness of aid flows, lowers the quality of the infrastructure and 
public services, and distorts the composition of government expenditure.12 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Although general economic 
progress over the last few years may be undeniable, the scourge of corruption has 
been spreading rapidly. Hence, as impeding development is one of the 
consequences of corruption, there is no doubt that if Ethiopia is to be emancipated 
from the shackles of poverty, corruption will have to be one of the first and biggest 
enemies it has to fight.  
As the institution that is charged with the mandate of preventing, investigating and 
prosecuting corruption, it would be crucial and appropriate for the FEACC to know 
what progress it has made since its inception in 2001, and whether there are factors 
impeding its success. Moreover, identifying the FEACC’s problems, if any, would be 
helpful towards rectifying them. 
 
1.4   Literature review 
It should be underscored at the outset that the amount of literature on the subject 
matter of this thesis (FEACC) is negligible. In particular, academic writings on the 
issue are almost non-existent.  
Generally speaking, the subject of combating corruption has evoked a considerable 
amount of comment in academic literature. Some have written generally on the 
                                                            
12 See Harms (2000: 166). Corruption alone is costing Africa nearly 150 billion US dollars a year, 
which amounts to 25% of the combined national income of African countries. See BBC News (2006).    
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approach and structure which institutions responding to corruption should take to 
maximise their effectiveness.13 Others have given assessments of other countries 
operation of anti-corruption commissions and agencies.14  
In the Ethiopian context, Megiso’s paper basically introduces the Commission and 
discusses its achievements and focal points since its inception.15 Therefore, the 
paper is more of a report than an academic endeavour and lacks the critical 
evaluation which this research paper seeks to provide.    
Although there are two detailed country reports available on the mandate and 
progress of the Commission,16 they do not deal directly with some of the major 
questions posed by this study, such as whether the FEACC is free from political 
interference and what lessons can it learn from best standards and practices?  
 
1.5   Scope of the study 
The subject area under consideration is extensive. For that reason, and taking into 
account the formal limitations, the proposed research will be confined mostly to the 
FEACC. However, some enquiry will be made into other anti-corruption commissions 
or agencies, to the extent that they may be relevant and helpful to analysing the 
FEACC. Reference will also be made to major relevant regional and international 
instruments on corruption. 
                                                            
13 See generally Meagher & Voland (2006); European Partners Working Group (2008); OECD (2007); 
De Sousa (2009).  
14 See, for example, Charron (2008) & Doig et al (2005).  
15 See Megiso (2007).  
16 See FEACC Annual Report (2008); Sartet (2004). 
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1.6   Overview of chapters 
The study consists of five chapters. This chapter sets out the context of study. It 
highlights the basis and structure of the study. The second chapter will look into the 
history of and motivation for the establishment of specialised anti-corruption 
institutions, and the different kinds of institutions created by different countries. The 
third chapter will identify factors that enhance the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
institutions. In doing so, it also will make reference to the practices of different anti-
corruption bodies found in different countries. The fourth chapter, which will use the 
third one as background, will reflect critically on the strengths and flaws of the 
Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. In chapter five, a 
conclusion is drawn and a way forward is indicated through recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SPECIALISED ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS 
 
2.1   Introduction 
One of the recent developments in the fight against corruption has been the 
recognition and importance given to institutions whose primary mandate is the 
performance of anti-corruption functions. This chapter will discuss the birth of these 
institutions, known as anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) or anti-corruption 
commissions (ACCs). Furthermore, the chapter examines the different international 
and regional anti-corruption instruments that prescribe specialised institutions for the 
fight against corruption. The major reasons for the establishment of these institutions 
will be discussed. The chapter will attempt also to identify and shed some light on the 
different categories of anti-corruption institutions that are currently in existence.       
 
2.2   Brief history of specialised anti-corruption institutions 
A distinguishing feature of the fight against corruption in the 1990s is the increased 
appreciation of the role played by specialised anti-corruption bodies.17 These bodies 
                                                            
17 As maintained by Pope (2000), according to Transparency International (TI), which is the biggest 
non-governmental organisation in the fight against corruption, because of the complex nature of 
corruption, fighting it demands taking a holistic approach. TI considers the elements of a society that 
contribute to the fight against corruption as its National Integrity System. These elements include:  the 
political will of the executive, auditor-general, ombudsman, independent anti-corruption agencies, 
parliament, the judiciary, administrative reforms, civil society, the media, the private sector and 
international institutions. These institutions and specific activities contribute to integrity, transparency 
and accountability in a society. Hence, any endeavour to combat corruption effectively and 
sustainably involves examining each of these institutions and practices and the various inter-
relationships to determine where remedial action is required. Specialised anti-corruption bodies 
constitute just one important aspect of the general national plan of action. See Pope (2000).  
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are “permanent government bodies whose primary function is to provide centralised 
leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity”.18  
According to De Sousa, while predecessors of these institutional units can be traced 
back in time, in the form of parliamentary commissions, inquiry committees, special 
police branches or anti-corruption leagues, the first ACAs date back to 1952.19 These 
first agencies were established due to the perceived failure of the British Colonial 
Government to devise an effective mechanism for fighting corruption20 or “to root out 
corruption and restore public confidence in the Government”21.  
Since the mid-1990s, the number of these bodies has proliferated. It has expanded 
from the developing22 to the developed world, and from societies in transition23 to 
consolidated democracies, as corruption started to be discussed and condemned all 
over the globe.24   
 
                                                            
18 See Meagher & Voland (2006: 5). These areas may include policy analysis and technical assistance 
in prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring, investigation and prosecution. However, 
there are organisations with different names, different forms of organisations, and different kinds of 
legal authority that can perform the functions that are carried out by an ACC or ACA. These bodies 
include Criminal Justice Commissions, Administrative Control Authorities, Serious Fraud Offices and 
the Office of the Ombudsman. See U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 
19 See De Sousa (2009: 1). The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was established in 
Singapore in October 1952.    
20 Due to rampant corruption in the police, which at the time was entrusted with the task of fighting 
corruption in Singapore, it was decided to rely on an autonomous agency. See Quah (2008: 5).  
21See Quah (2008: 10). The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was established in 
Hong Kong in February 1974 after the chief superintendent of the Hong Kong Police fled to the United 
Kingdom in mid-1973, while under investigation for alleged corruption by the Anti-Corruption Office of 
the Police. This Office is mandated to investigate allegations of corruption in the civil service. The 
mishandling of this case triggered a huge public outcry against the Government. Ultimately, this led to 
the establishment of the independent Commission, which was taken as a new and alternative anti-
corruption arrangement. See Johnston (1999: 219).     
22 Developing states have been under significant international pressure to curb domestic corruption 
from such international and regional organisations as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). See Charron (2008: 3).  
23 See OECD (2005: 24-25) and Dionisie & Checchi (2008: 4). 
24 See Arze et al (2006: 7).To a large extent, the assumption that specialised anti-corruption agencies 
can have a significant contribution in curbing corruption at a national level is attributable to the 
successful model of the Hong Kong Anti-Corruption Agency which produced significant reductions of 
corruption in a society where that seemed unlikely. See Johnston & Doig (1999: 27).      
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2.3   International and regional instruments calling for specialised anti-corruption           
institutions     
In the mid-1990s the problem of corruption was recognised as a subject of 
international concern and drew the attention of numerous global and regional inter-
governmental organisations. As a result, the last decade witnessed a growing 
collection of international and regional instruments that are designed to enhance the 
fight against corruption at a domestic level. Most importantly, for purposes of this 
paper, these instruments advocate the establishment of specialised entities as one 
means of fighting corruption.  
    
2.3.1   The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption25  
This Convention has been ratified by 41 States, including Belarus which is not a 
member state of the Council of Europe.26 Article 20 of the Convention, under the title 
‘Specialised Authorities’, provides that:  
Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure 
that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against corruption. 
They shall have the necessary independence in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of the legal system of the Party, in order for 
them to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free from any 
undue pressure. The Party shall ensure that the staff of such entities 
has adequate training and financial resources for their tasks. 
 
Even though the Convention does not identify explicitly the activities that 
need specialisation, it generally recognises the need to make sure that 
persons and entities in the fight against corruption are specialised.     
 
                                                            
25 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (adopted 4 November 1998 and entered 
into force 1 July 2002). 
26 See Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption: Status.  
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2.3.2   The United Nations Convention against Corruption  
UNCAC has been ratified by 136 States Parties, including Ethiopia and 39 other 
African States.27 According to Article 6 of the Convention: 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its 
legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that 
prevent corruption by such means as: 
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this Convention    
and, where appropriate, overseeing and co-ordinating the implementation of 
those policies; 
(b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of 
corruption. 
2. Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this article the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or 
their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The necessary 
material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training that such staff 
may require to carry out their functions, should be provided.  
 
Article 36 of the Convention further stipulates that: 
Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal 
system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in 
combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons 
shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their 
functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of 
such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry 
out their tasks. 
 
UNCAC contains the most detailed provisions of all the anti-corruption instruments 
pertaining to the different activities that can be undertaken by an anti-corruption body 
or bodies. According to the Convention, it is up to States Parties to decide whether to 
establish an entirely new and independent body or to designate the anti-corruption 
functions to a body or bodies within an existing organisation. However, while the 
Convention deals with preventive and law enforcement functions under different 
                                                            
27 See United Nations Convention against Corruption: Status. 
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articles, States Parties may decide to entrust one specialised body with a 
combination of preventive and law enforcement functions.28   
 
2.3.3   The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption  
The AU Convention has been ratified by 29 States, including Ethiopia.29 Under 
Article 20(5):  
States Parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that national 
authorities or agencies are specialized in combating corruption and related offences 
by, among others, ensuring that the staff are trained and motivated to effectively carry 
out their duties.  
 
Although not as detailed as UNCAC, the Convention imposes on States Parties the 
duty to ensure the specialisation of entities entrusted with the task of fighting 
corruption.  
 
2.3.4   The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption30  
The SADC Protocol, which is open to Member States of the SADC, has 14 
signatories and has been ratified by 9 of them.31 Article 4(1)(g) of the Protocol 
provides that States Parties undertake to create, maintain and strengthen 
“institutions responsible for implementing mechanisms for preventing, detecting, 
punishing and eradicating corruption”. Even though it does not state specifically that 
anti-corruption institutions should be specialised, the Protocol demands their 
establishment and strengthening. And one way to strengthen them is through the 
recruitment and training of staff with a view to specialisation.             
                                                            
28 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Prevention for Treaty Affairs (21: 2006). 
29 See African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: Status. 
30 South African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (adopted 14 August 2001 and 
entered into force 6 July 2005),     
31See Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption: Status.  
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2.3.5   The Inter-American Convention against Corruption32  
This Convention, which was the first major regional Convention in the fight against 
corruption, has 33 ratifications and accessions, with only one signatory that has not 
ratified.33 Article III Paragraph 9 requires States Parties to consider creating, 
maintaining and strengthening “oversight bodies with a view to implementing modern 
mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt acts”. This 
provision is similar to the one found in the SADC Protocol in that it requires States to 
strengthen their anti-corruption institutions. As discussed above, one way of making 
sure that the institution is strengthened is by ensuring that the staff has the required 
training and know-how.      
As indicated above, although different in scope, content and objectives, international 
and regional instruments recognise the need for a clear specialisation in the area of 
corruption. It is also worth noting that the obligation of institutional specialisation 
under UNCAC is mandatory. Even though there is no consensus on the form of 
specialisation required, it has been maintained that, due to the complex nature of 
corruption, experts with specific knowledge and training from a variety of fields are 
needed to fight it effectively.34   
 
2.4   The purpose of anti-corruption agencies       
According to De Sousa, the rationale for the establishment of a specialised anti-
corruption institution is combating corruption in an “independent, knowledge-based 
fashion and developing a preventive measure in which scientific research plays a 
                                                            
32 Inter-American Convention against Corruption (adopted 29 March 1996 and entered into force 6 
March 1997),  
33 See Inter-American Convention against Corruption status. 
34 See De Sousa (2008: 7). According to Camerer (1999: 2), these fields include law, finance, 
economics and accounting.   
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central role”.35 However, in democratic societies, anti-corruption functions36 usually 
are available in existing institutions.37 These anti-corruption functions normally are 
spread across many institutions and, hence, there is no single body that 
systematises and makes sure that the anti-corruption functions are being carried out 
coherently and with shared objectives.38 Furthermore, a specialised anti-corruption 
institution may be needed to retain control over the chain of command and overcome 
the barriers of conventional corruption combating mechanisms.39     
Generally, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the imperative reason for establishing a new anti-corruption 
institution is based on the expectation that, unlike existing state institutions,40 it  
(i) will not itself be tainted by corruption or political intrusion; (ii) will resolve 
coordination problems among multiple agencies through vertical integration; 
and (iii) can centralise all necessary information and intelligence about 
corruption and can assert leadership in the anti-corruption effort.41 
 
From the aforementioned reasons, it can be inferred why ACAs are given preference 
to spearhead national anti-corruption movements. Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in 
mind that the ultimate goal should not be establishing them, but making sure that 
they achieve the goals for which they are established.       
 
                                                            
35 De Sousa (2008: 13). 
36 These functions include detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, ensuring 
transparency of public expenditure through financial control, and securing open government through 
access to information and openness to civil society. 
37 See OECD (2007: 34). 
38 See Hussmann et al (2009: 17). 
39 See De Sousa (2008: 13). This is especially the case in situations where there is systemic 
corruption and distrust of justice institutions.    
40 One of the major reasons why ACAs are regarded by governments, donors and international 
governmental organisations (IGOs) as the ultimate institutional response to corruption is because of 
the perceived failure of law enforcement bodies such as the police and attorneys-general offices. See 
De Sousa (2009: 1).      
41 See OECD (2007: 35).  
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2.5   Models of Specialised ACAs 
International standards do not imply that there is a single best model for a 
specialised anti-corruption institution nor do they strictly require the existence or 
establishment of a consolidated entity to fight corruption. Hence, it is the 
responsibility of individual countries to find the most effective institutional solution for 
their local context and situation. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made by the 
OECD to classify existing specialised anti-corruption institutions, in accordance with 
their main functions.42 It has identified three categories: Multiple-purpose agencies 
with law enforcement powers; preventive, policy development and co-ordination 
institutions; and law enforcement type institutions. An additional fourth model is 
identified by Khemani, namely, multi-purpose institution with law enforcement and 
prosecutorial powers.43    
 
2.5.1   Multiple-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers 
This model refers to ACAs which combine preventive and repressive powers and that 
engage in a wide spectrum of activities that go beyond traditional criminal 
investigation. These activities include: policy analysis; counselling and technical 
assistance; providing information and education; ethics monitoring; training and 
scientific research (into high risk areas, surveys, etc).44 In the majority of cases, the 
prosecutorial power is made an outside function, so that a single body will not have 
too much power.45  
 
                                                            
42 See OECD (2007: 23).  
43 See Khemani (2009: 17). 
44 See De Sousa (2009: 14). Agencies that fall within this category can be found in Hong Kong, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Botswana, and Uganda. 
45 See De Sousa (2008: 4). 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
2.5.2   Preventive, policy development and co-ordination institutions 
This model focuses on one or more corruption prevention functions.46 These include: 
research; monitoring the implementation of national and local anti-corruption 
strategies; reviewing and preparing relevant legislation; monitoring declaration-of- 
assets requirements for public officials; elaboration and implementation of codes of 
ethics; assisting in training for officials; and facilitating international co-operation with 
civil society.47  
 
2.5.3   Law enforcement type institutions 
These specialised agencies often have the prosecutorial authority in specific cases 
and sometimes they also have investigative structures and functions.48 However, on 
occasion it may be difficult to establish the difference between this category and the 
other two. This is because the specialised agencies under this category may also 
have important preventive functions and are required to support the development of 
anti-corruption strategies and legislation, as well as conducting research on 
corruption.49 This perhaps is the most common model applied in Western Europe.50    
 
                                                            
46 For more on the preventive role of ACAs see generally Gorta (2008).   
47 See OECD (2007: 32). Examples of such institutions can be found in France, Britain, Albania, and 
the United States.    
48 Dionisie & Checchi (2008: 7). 
49 Dionisie & Checchi (2008: 7). 
50 See OECD (2007: 32). Countries such as Norway, Belgium, Spain, Croatia, Romania and Hungary 
have adopted such a model.  
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2.5.4   Multi-purpose institutions with law enforcement and prosecutorial powers  
While the current anti-corruption literature51 also identifies models of anti-corruption 
institutions based on the above-mentioned functions, Khemani argues that a fourth 
model should be identified: the “multi-purpose institutions with law enforcement and 
prosecutorial powers model”. 52 The reason why this model is separately identified 
from the ones discussed above is because there are anti-corruption institutions 
combining investigative, preventive, educational and prosecutorial functions. An 
example of this type of commission would be the Nigerian Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
 
2.6   Conclusion 
In recent years, the establishment and specialisation of anti-corruption bodies have 
been given preference by anti-corruption campaigners and policy makers. This can 
be deduced also from some of the major anti-corruption international and regional 
instruments. The variety of functions entrusted to these specialised bodies is an 
indication of the major role they are expected to play in the overall fight against 
corruption. It is pertinent also to take into account that there is no conventional single 
model which is recommended for all states. However, it is essential to show the 
different forms available to help identify which is appropriate to fit the circumstances 
of a particular country. The next chapter will enquire into standards and best 
practices for making anti-corruption institutions effective.                    
  
          
                                                            
51 See, for example, Heilbrunn (2006: 136). 
52 See Khemani (2009: 17-18).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS: DRIVERS OF 
SUCCESS AND BEST PRACTICES 
 
3.1   Introduction 
One of the major arguments in favour of the establishment of an independent anti-
corruption institution is the inability of existing government institutions, especially 
supervisory and law enforcement agencies, effectively to fight and curb corruption. 
This can be ascribed mostly to lack of efficient resources to deal with the complex 
nature of corruption, the institutions being corrupt themselves and lack of public trust. 
Hence, if anti-corruption institutions are to spearhead the fight against corruption in a 
country, they need to overcome the flaws and limitations of their predecessors. 
Although it is virtually impossible to conduct a concrete measure of the costs and 
benefits of the introduction of an anti-corruption institution,53 it has been maintained 
that it is possible to improve and enhance the impact of an anti-corruption institution 
in the overall national anti-corruption strategy.54   
This chapter will endeavour to identify a number of factors that need due 
consideration in order to enhance the effective functionality of anti-corruption 
institutions. These factors include: the independence of the institution; appointment 
of executives of the institution; political willingness of the government; positioning of 
the institution; oversight over the institution; expertise of the staff; funding; and public 
awareness and trust. Where possible and appropriate, an attempt will be made to 
make reference to the relevant institutional practices of different countries.  
                                                            
53 See Smilov (2009: 14). 
54 See De Speville (2008: 6). 
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3.2   Drivers of success and best practices 
3.2.1   Choosing the right institutional arrangement 
As discussed in the previous chapter,55 there is no one-size-fits-all institutional 
arrangement that can be recommended for every country. For this reason, from the 
outset, policy makers should assess whether establishing a new anti-corruption 
institution is necessary, considering the context of the particular country, or whether 
an existing institution should be adapted to have an ACA.56  
 
3.2.2   Independence of ACAs 
The independence of anti-corruption institutions is fundamental for their success. 
Although it is difficult to talk of complete independence, because these bodies need 
to be supervised by external control, the international and regional anti-corruption 
instruments propagate that necessary independence and autonomy be ensured. 57 
The aim of this guarantee is to assure the effectiveness and freedom from undue 
influence of anti-corruption institutions. Ensuring the required independence includes 
considerations such as: where the institution is positioned; the personal features of 
persons appointed as senior officials; the procedure followed for their appointment; 
and budget and fiscal autonomy.58   
 
                                                            
55 See the discussion under Section 2.5 above. 
56 See OSCE (2004: 168). 
57 See, for example, Articles 6(2) & 36 of UNCAC and Article 5(3) of the AU Convention.    
58 See Pope (2000: 95-97). 
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3.2.2.1   Where should ACAs be positioned? 
According to TI, the success of the Singapore and the Hong Kong agencies owes 
much to their institutional placement.59 However, what worked for them does not 
necessarily work for others. This is so because usually ‘grand corruption’ takes place 
in and around the executive body of a State. Thus, if positioned in such an office, an 
anti-corruption institution’s ability to curb corruption may be compromised.60 In such 
situations, it has been argued that an ACA should preferably be responsible to the 
legislature instead of the executive.61    
 
3.2.2.2   Appointment of executives 
The major challenge in appointing executives of anti-corruption institutions is to 
ensure that persons of integrity, who enjoy independence from political interference 
are selected.62 TI recommends that an appointment mechanism that guarantees 
consensus support for an appointee through parliament, together with an external 
accountability mechanism, which can be a Parliamentary Select Committee on which 
all major parties are represented, can reduce the room for abuse or biased 
activities.63 
Thus, so that the office holder can check the executive if necessary, the appointment 
procedure must be one which involves more actors than those presently in power. 
Even if the exact appointment procedure may vary from country to country, it should 
                                                            
59 See Pope (2000: 96). While Singapore’s agency is situated in the office of the Prime Minister, Hong 
Kong’s is placed in the office of the Governor.  
60 For example, the agencies in Tanzania and Zambia, which are housed within the president’s office, 
failed to tackle corruption within the national political leadership. See Pope & Vogl (2000: 8).     
61 See OSCE (2004: 168).   
62 Jennett (2007: 1). 
63 See Pope (2000: 97).  
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be one that ensures that people of integrity are selected and that they are protected 
from political pressures while they are in office.64 
 
3.2.2.3   Budget and fiscal autonomy of ACAs 
The importance of adequate funding is crucial for an anti-corruption institution. 
Assuring full financial independence, however, is usually difficult, because budget is 
usually allocated by the Government and approved by the Parliament in most 
countries. Nevertheless, mechanisms, such as a legal framework, need to be 
devised to curb the unfettered discretion of the executive over the level of funding.65 
 
3.2.3   Accountability and transparency of ACAs    
The type of independence envisaged under international and regional anti-corruption 
instruments should not amount to lack of accountability. This is best demonstrated by 
the Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, which submits that: 
The independence of specialised authorities for the fight against corruption, should 
not be an absolute one. Indeed, their activities should be, as far as possible, 
integrated and co-ordinated with the work carried out by the police, the 
administration or the public prosecutor’s office. The level of independence required 
for these specialised services is the one that is necessary to perform properly their 
functions.66 Among other things, the level of accountability required for anti-
corruption institutions is dependent on their level of specialisation, their institutional 
position and their powers over other institutions and individuals.67   
                                                            
64 See Pope & Vogl (2000: 8).   
65 See OECD (2007: 19). 
66 See paragraph 99, Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption: Explanatory Report. 
67 See OECD (2007: 19). 
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Accountability of anti-corruption institutions is essential for ensuring their credibility 
and transparency, and for building the public’s trust.68 Consequently, taking into 
consideration the big role attached to the need to account, several countries have 
devised multiple reporting lines or have shifted the reporting line to parliament to 
avoid manipulation by the main institutional hosts of their anti-corruption institutions.69  
For instance, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of New South 
Wales is held accountable to citizens through the multiparty Parliamentary Joint 
Committee (PJC)70 and through its obligation to report regularly to the public and 
annually on its major investigations.71 Where the PJC decides to do so, it may bring 
to the attention of the Parliament any matter related to the ICAC.72    
The Hong Kong ICAC has four advisory committees, namely, the Corruption 
Prevention Advisory Committee, the Citizens Advisory Committee on Community 
Relations, the Operations Review Committee and the Corruption Prevention Advisory 
Committee.73 Through these Committees, comprised of prominent community 
members, citizens play a vital role in monitoring the Commission’s actions.74    
Another method followed by some states is to shift reporting lines from the prime 
minister or the president to the peoples’ representative body of the parliament.75 This 
will allow for the work of the anti-corruption institution to be scrutinised by various 
                                                            
68 See European Partners Working Group (2008: 9).  
69 UNDP (2005: 6). 
70 See Sections 63 & 64 of the Independent Commission against Corruption Act (ICAC Act) No 35 of 
1988.  
71 See Sections 74 & 76 of the ICAC Act. 
72 See Section 64(1)(b) of the ICAC Act. 
73 See ICAC Advisory Committees. 
74 See Heilbrunn (2004: 4). 
75 See UNDP (2005: 6). 
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political parties. In this regard, Zambia has made its Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC) report to Parliament instead of to the Head of State.76 
 
3.2.4   Adequate resources  
International and regional anti-corruption instruments provide that institutions created 
to fight corruption should have the required financial resources and properly trained 
staff.77 Establishing and maintaining an anti-corruption institution is expensive. 
However, if not supported by adequate resources, the institution is unlikely to obtain 
and maintain public confidence because its activities will be hampered.78 In addition, 
as mentioned in chapter two,79 the fight against corruption requires not only well- 
trained investigators and prosecutors, but also forensic specialists, financial experts, 
auditors, information technology specialists and so forth.80 The number of staff of an 
anti-corruption institution should also be commensurate with the activities it is 
expected to perform.  
In spite of this knowledge, however, governments regularly fail to provide the required 
financial and human resources to anti-corruption institutions. Although, sometimes, 
there may be legitimate justifications for this failure, such as shortage of resources in 
a country, in most cases, as the OECD submits, the reason is lack of genuine political 
will to fight corruption, or lack of knowledge by decision makers of the complexity of 
corruption.81     
                                                            
76 See UNDP (2005: 6). 
77 See the discussion under Section 2.3 above.  
78 See OECD (2007: 19). 
79 See the discussion under Section 2.4 above. 
80 See OECD (2007: 19). 
81 See OECD (2007: 20). 
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Besides law enforcement institutions, courts should also have the required 
knowledge on how to handle corruption cases.82 This is because institutions that 
investigate and prosecute corruption cases cannot be effective if the courts are not 
equipped and skilled to the extent that will allow them to deal with complex cases of 
corruption. Usually this can be done by training judges who often preside over 
corruption cases.  
 
3.2.5   Focus of ACAs 
It has been held that anti-corruption institutions should not be expected to fulfil a wide 
range of functions which their organisational capacity does not allow, and that all 
extraneous functions must be delegated to other agencies.83 In order to be effective, 
an anti-corruption institution needs to define its focus strategically.84 For instance, its 
jurisdiction could be mainly prospective by limiting its concern with past cases (as is 
the case in Hong Kong).85   
 
3.2.6   Monitoring wealth of public officials and criminalising unexplained property 
Public office holders are expected to act in the interests of the public. Citizens have 
an interest to know whether individuals working in public offices are serving the public 
interest with fairness, and administrating public resources properly. Thus, to develop 
and maintain public trust and confidence in public officials, and to uphold a system of 
accountability and transparency and minimise incidents of corruption, many 
                                                            
82 See OECD (2007: 20). 
83 See Doig et al (2005: 47). 
84 See Meagher & Voland (2006: 9). 
85 See Meagher & Voland (2006: 9).  
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governments require that public office holders disclose their assets.86 International 
and regional anti-corruption instruments also enjoin states to require all or designated 
public officials to declare their assets.87    
On the one hand, due to its clandestine nature, detecting an act of corruption and, 
especially, producing sufficient evidence in court to secure the conviction of offenders 
is difficult.88 On the other hand, it is relatively easy to discover wealth of an official 
that is manifestly out of proportion to his or her present or past official income.89 As a 
result, to fight corruption effectively, anti-corruption laws have been developed in 
such a way as to allow for this unique feature of corruption.90 And one such law 
developed by states and later incorporated into international and regional anti-
corruption instruments91 is the criminalisation of illicit enrichment or possession of 
unexplained wealth. The act is generally considered a criminal offence where a public 
official is found to be in possession of property which appears to be beyond his or her 
lawful income, provided that he or she fails to give a satisfactory explanation as to 
how he or she acquired it. Such states as Hong Kong92 and Botswana,93 that have 
been praised for their success in combating corruption, have been using this crime to 
convict high-ranking state officials whom they could not have convicted otherwise.94 
For example, in Hong Kong, in the 25 years that the offence has existed, at least 50 
                                                            
86 See Larbi (2005: 2). 
87 See Article 52(5) of UNCAC and Article 7 of the AU Convention. While the requirement of disclosure 
of assets is not mandatory under UNCAC, it has been made mandatory under the AU Convention.   
88 See Wilsher (2006: 1). 
89 See Asian Development Bank (2004: 37). 
90 See Kututwa (2007: 5). 
91 See Articles 8 and 20 of the AU Convention and UNCAC respectively. Both instruments request 
States Parties to consider criminalising inexplicable wealth of public officials.    
92 See Section 10 of the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (1971).  
93 See Section 34 of the Botswana Corruption and Economic Crime Act (1994). 
94 Wysluch (2007: 7). 
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cases have been prosecuted and among the accused are to be found high-ranking 
state officials who would have been otherwise hard to prosecute.95   
Therefore, such legal frameworks that can enable anti-corruption institutions to 
monitor the assets, income and life-styles of public servants should be available.  And 
in appropriate situations, anti-corruption institutions should be able to prosecute those 
holding public office and against whom direct evidence of corruption has been difficult 
to adduce. This may be justifiable where it can be proved that they are leading a life 
that is not commensurate with their incomes, hence creating a prima facie suspicion 
that they have been prospering at the expense of the public.   
     
3.2.7   Civil asset forfeiture    
In addition to the punishment of offenders, an important measure to prevent crime is 
sending the message that crime does not pay. As former Mafia Don Gaspare Motolo 
said, “Criminals prefer to be put behind bars and keep their money than to stay free 
without the money”.96 Forfeiture of the proceeds of corruption is therefore an 
important factor to curb corruption. The campaign to forfeit the proceeds of corruption 
has also been underpinned by international and regional anti-corruption 
instruments.97    
There are two ways in which forfeiture of criminal property can be attained, namely, 
conviction-based forfeiture and civil asset forfeiture.98 Conviction-based forfeiture, as 
the name itself implies, requires obtaining a criminal conviction against the owner of 
                                                            
95 Wysluch (2007: 8). 
96 Wysluch (2007: 8). 
97 See Articles 31 and 16 of UNCAC and AU Convention respectively. Both instruments oblige their 
States Parties to take the necessary legislative measures to freeze and confiscate proceeds of 
corruption and instruments used to commit corruption.   
98 See Simser (2009: 15). 
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the property and is part of the sentencing process. Civil asset forfeiture, by contrast, 
has nothing to do with the charging, prosecution or conviction of any individual. 
Generally, an action is brought by the state not against individuals, but against the 
designated property (in rem).99  
The benefit of the civil forfeiture proceeding is that, even if a suspect is acquitted in a 
criminal court because the state could not prove his or her guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt, a civil action can still be brought against property which is considered to be 
proceeds of crime or property used to facilitate crime.100 Hence, if the state can 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the property is the proceeds of a crime, or 
was used in the crime, then a forfeiture order can be rendered by a court.  
Anti-corruption institutions should, therefore, have a civil asset forfeiture system at 
their disposal to deter corruption more effectively. This is likely to be of paramount 
importance for those states that do not have well-trained investigators and the 
required technology to investigate a complex crime like corruption. In case the 
prosecutors in these states fail to have a corrupt public official criminally convicted, it 
is still possible to proceed against the ill-gotten property via a non-criminal avenue. In 
this regard, South Africa can be cited as a good example for its success in initiating 
and succeeding in civil asset forfeiture actions.101     
              
                                                            
99 See Simser (2009: 13).  
100 See OSCE (2004: 174). 
101 See OSCE (2004: 174). According to Shaw (2002: 133) assets seized using the civil asset 
forfeiture strategy as of 2002 alone have exceeded 11 million US dollars in value, with a success rate 
of 90%.   
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3.2.8   Co-operation with civil society and the media  
Legislation and institutionalisation by itself will not be enough to enforce transparency 
and accountability of government. Civil society and the media have very crucial role 
to play in ensuring the sustenance of corruption-free governance.102  
TI emphasises the vital role played by civil society in the fight against corruption: 
Governments could not hope to tame corruption without the help and support of 
their people – and that the way to build this support is through serious-minded 
NGOs who are prepared to form cooperative but independent and critical 
partnerships with their governments.103  
One of the major aims of anti-corruption institutions is to prevent corruption by 
changing social attitudes towards corruption. Strategies aimed at changing the 
perception of corruption are pertinent particularly where systemic corruption is 
present and citizens are accustomed to paying bribes as a normal phenomenon. 
Civil society programs can help raise awareness about corruption and increase 
citizen partnership.104 Also, civil society and the media can help anti-corruption 
institutions to counteract any tendency among public officials to undermine 
existing checks and balances.105 They can monitor whether a government is 
complying with its commitment to fighting corruption or they can expose cases 
of corruption and campaign for investigations and punishments.106 In addition, 
they can liaise with anti-corruption institutions in relation to evidence and 
relevant information and testify at hearings.107    
    
                                                            
102 See Kumar (2004: 338-340). See also Articles 13 and 12 of UNCAC and the AU Convention 
respectively. Among other things, the instruments call for States Parties to take appropriate measures 
to promote the active participation of civil society, non-governmental organisations and community- 
based organisations in the fight against and prevention of corruption. Furthermore, these instruments 
stipulate that States Parties should ensure that the media is given access to information in cases of 
corruption and related offences to the extent that it would not interfere with fundamental rights.     
103 See Pope (2000: 134). 
104 See Johnson (2005: 85). 
105 See Gyimah-Boadi (1999: 2). 
106 See OECD (2003: 21).   
107 See Gyimah-Boadi (1999: 2). 
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3.2.9   Co-ordination and co-operation with other institutions  
Anti-corruption bodies cannot operate in an institutional vacuum. They are just 
one important part of the National Integrity System. They can achieve what they 
are established to do only if they can direct their efforts in a co-ordinated 
manner with other national authorities.108 Where anti-corruption institutions are 
entrusted to carry out corruption preventive functions, they need to co-operate 
with government bodies to implement corruption preventive measures such as a 
new work method in a government office.109 The importance of co-operation 
between national authorities in combating corruption can be also inferred from 
UNCAC, which provides that public authorities and public officials should be 
encouraged by states to co-operate with corruption investigation and 
prosecution authorities.110 As anti-corruption institutions usually investigate and 
prosecute corruption that takes place in the public sector, they are dependent 
on public authorities and public officials for information about the alleged 
commission of corruption offences.  
 
3.2.10   International co-operation networks 
Corruption is a transnational phenomenon. Although anti-corruption institutions 
have been established to fight national corruption, situations may arise where 
they require co-operation in the international arena.111 Involvement in 
international co-operation networks and participation in fora that open 
                                                            
108 See Hussmann et al (2009: 17). 
109 See Hussmann et al (2009: 18). 
110 See Article 38 of UNCAC.  
111 UNCAC has devoted an entire chapter (Chapter IV) to dealing with issues of international co-
operation. 
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opportunities to share experiences and know-how are crucial for an anti-
corruption institution to do its work effectively.112  
 
3.2.11   Contributory role of anti-corruption institutions 
It is noteworthy that even when ACCs or ACAs are successful, they still have to 
rely on other institutions. If, for example, the judiciary is weak and unpredictable, 
then fighting corruption through the courts will be challenging. Especially where 
widespread corruption exists, anti-corruption institutions cannot be expected to 
provide a complete answer.113 However, they can be one very important 
component in the overall national anti-corruption action. 
 
3.2.12   Government commitment and political will to fight corruption 
It has been held widely that political leadership and commitment to fight 
corruption at the highest levels is one of the most important preconditions for 
success in the fight against corruption.114 Political will with respect to fighting 
corruption means political support to make sure that, among other things, the 
resources, independence and accountability mechanisms required for the anti-
corruption institution to be successful, are put in place.  
    
                                                            
112 See European Partners Working Group (2008: 13-14). 
113 OSCE (2004: 175). A single ACA, even where it is adequately funded and well staffed, cannot 
hope to reach beyond a relatively few instances of high profile corruption, especially where the country 
is geographically vast and with a large population. See Jacobs & Wagner (2007: 330). 
114 See Simons (2009: 15). 
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3.3   Conclusion   
The list of factors and best practices that can be determining for the success of 
anti-corruption institutions provided in this chapter is not comprehensive. 
Undoubtedly, a number of other reasons may be cited for the failure of a 
particular anti-corruption institution and hence of the accompanying cures. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that observing and applying at least some of the 
abovementioned elements and accompanying recommendations and best 
practices will enhance the performance of an anti-corruption institution. The next 
chapter will endeavour to introduce the Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission and examine its compatibility with some of the 
standards discussed in this chapter.           
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FEDERAL ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION OF ETHIOPIA 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Over the last two decades several developing countries have opted for creating an 
institution charged with the overall responsibility of fighting corruption.115  
Nevertheless, corruption remains a challenge in most developing countries, 
especially those in Africa.116 For this reason````, it is important to analyse the 
contribution of anti-corruption institutions to the overall national anti-corruption 
movement in order to review, strengthen and improve their efforts.  
This chapter will shed some light first on the historical and political background of 
Ethiopia in an attempt to facilitate understanding of the discussion in subsequent 
sections. The chapter will then endeavour to discuss the road map that led to the 
establishment of the Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
(FEACC). In addition, the different features of the Commission, including its 
independence, accountability, powers and duties, allocation of budget and co-
operation with other anti-corruption campaigners, will be elucidated. Finally, the 
achievements it has registered in the fight against corruption will be assessed.  
        
4.2   Physiognomy of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is a country with a population over 80 million and a territorial jurisdiction of 
47 776 square miles. Emperor Haile Selassie ruled the country from 1930 to 1974, 
                                                            
115 See Heilbrunn (2004: 2). 
116 See Khan (2006: 2). 
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when he was replaced by a military government (Derg), which ruled until it was 
overthrown in 1991 by the coalition Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF).     
Currently, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) comprises the 
Federal Government and nine State members.117 Power is divided between the 
executive, legislature and judiciary.118 The legislative body is the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives, which nominates both the Head of the State and the Prime 
Minister.119 The Prime Minister is the chief executive and heads the Council of 
Ministers, which is made up of representatives from a coalition of parties constituting 
a majority in the legislature.120 The Ethiopian judicial system consists of the Federal 
courts which have jurisdiction over Federal matters, and State courts which have 
jurisdiction over State concerns.121 Criminal law in the country is uniform as it is only 
in matters that are not covered by Federal penal legislation that States may enact 
penal laws.122                      
 
4.3   Establishing the FEACC  
As is the case with most developing countries, high levels of corruption exist in 
Ethiopia. According to research, corruption in Ethiopia is attributable to a number of 
factors.123 During the Derg regime, despite coming to power with a promise to tackle 
corruption and actually taking some steps to prosecute corrupt personnel, anti-
                                                            
117 Article 50(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution (1995). 
118 Article 50(2) of the Ethiopian Constitution. 
119 Articles 70 and 73 of the Ethiopian Constitution.  
120 Article 72(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution.  
121 Article 78(1-3) of the Ethiopian Constitution. 
122 Article 55(5) of the Ethiopian Constitution. 
123 The major ones include poor governance, lack of accountability and transparency, lack of citizen 
participation, low level of institutional control, extreme poverty and inequality, harmful cultural 
practices and centralisation of authority and resources. See Megiso (2007: 2). 
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corruption efforts were not sustained over time, due mostly to a lack of resources 
(financial and human) and political interference.124 In any case, corruption is said to 
have affected the country devastatingly during the imperial and Derg regimes.125 
Regrettably, that trend continues currently, and corruption is contributing significantly 
to the reduction of government revenue and is hampering the country’s poverty 
reduction programme.126   
The Ethiopian Government commissioned a corruption survey in 2001 in order to 
understand how severe the problem was and how it was affecting the country. The 
survey revealed, among other things, the presence of a generalised dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the public sector. People working in customs, land 
distribution, public housing, telephone, water and other public services were reported 
to be engaged in institutionalised corrupt practices.127 The Ethiopian Government 
conducted a Civil Service Reform Programme which included an ethics sub-
programme that was designed mainly to tackle corruption and improve service 
delivery. It was at this stage, then, that the corruption in public institutions was 
revealed.128 In the same year, the Institute of Educational Research in Ethiopia also 
conducted research on 600 firms. It was revealed that 78.5% of these firms, which 
are found across the regional States, considered corruption in the public sector to be 
the number one factor that negatively influenced their operations and growth.129  
                                                            
124 See Olowu (2000: 265) For example, specialised agencies created with extensive powers of 
prosecution and punishing ethical breaches during the Derg regime include the Special Court, the 
Procuracy and the Working People’s Control Committee.   
125 It is said to have undermined the legitimacy of the governments, weakening their structures, 
reducing productivity, hindering development, worsening poverty, creating social unrest and, finally, 
speeding up their downfall. Megiso (2007: 2).  
126 See Megiso (2007: 2). 
127 See African Development Bank Group (2003: 16). 
128 See Megiso (2007: 2). 
129 See Getahun (2006: 5).   
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The abovementioned findings led to donor pressure to combat corruption.130 This 
was further reinforced by the TI corruption report which placed Ethiopia in 59th place 
out of 104 countries in its latest Corruption Perceptions Index.131 Based on these 
findings, a central body, the FEACC, was established by parliament on 24 May 2001, 
with the objectives of promoting ethics and anti-corruption education, and of 
preventing, investigating and prosecuting corruption offences and other 
improprieties.132  
The FEACC resembles Khemani’s “multiple-purpose institutions with law 
enforcement and prosecutorial powers” model.133 It is submitted that the adoption of 
this model is commendable for a number of reasons. The law enforcement 
institutions in the country suffer from certain major shortcomings. The Police has 
been one of the most corrupt and politically biased public institutions.134 Furthermore, 
it has a very poor public image and suffers considerably from lack of resources 
(financial, technological and skilled staff).135 The Public Prosecution Service is 
considered also to be politically biased and in significant shortage of qualified 
prosecutors.136 Leaving the fight against corruption to these traditional law 
enforcement institutions would minimise the level of attention it requires in the 
country. In addition, the working of prosecutors and investigators in partnership 
under one body has the advantage of enhancing the specialisation and efficiency of 
                                                            
130 See Mwenda (2002: 2). 
131 See African Development Bank Group (2003: 16).    
132 See Article 6 of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Establishing Proclamation No. 235/2001 
(hereafter Repealed Establishing Proclamation). This Proclamation was, however, later revised and 
repealed in 2005 by Proclamation No. 433/2005. Some commentators were, however, totally sceptical 
about the purpose for which the Commission was established. They claim that the Commission was 
created principally to pursue powerful figures who had fallen out of favour with the ruling party. See 
Belai (2004); Justice in Ethiopia (2002).             
133 See the discussion under Section 2.5.4 above.  
134 See Global Integrity Report Ethiopia: Law Enforcement Integrity Indicators Scorecard (2008). 
135 See Vibhute (2009: 3). 
136 See Vibhute (2009: 3). 
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anti-corruption law enforcement, which the country needs.137 Within existing 
institutional structures, it is difficult to achieve the kind of honest and efficient law 
enforcement efforts necessary to punish perpetrators of corruption offences and 
deter future offenders. Hence the need for the FEACC.   
It has been asserted that those countries that have established only “preventive, 
policy development and co-ordination institutions” are countries whose bureaucratic 
institutions are strong and efficient, and have sufficient resources and good 
coordination.138 However, as is the situation in most African countries,139 Ethiopia 
has neither the required institutional capacity nor a well-developed inter-agency 
cooperation culture to implement that type of institutional anti-corruption 
arrangement. 
Considering its magnitude and what corruption is costing the country, it makes 
sense, in the pursuit of effectiveness and efficiency, to centralise and vertically 
integrate anti-corruption functions under a single designated body. The creation of a 
distinct body also demonstrates, on the symbolic level, that the government has the 
commitment to fight corruption, which is important in gaining public support and 
awareness.140 Yet, needless to say, even though establishing the appropriate 
institutional framework is a significant step towards combating corruption, building 
the capacity and ensuring the effectiveness of the Commission is the next critical 
measure.            
                                                            
137 See Khemani (2009: 23). 
138 See UNDP (2008: 17). For example, those anti-corruption institutional models that are found in the 
United States and the United Kingdom incorporate a number of branches and departments of 
government.  
139 See Khemani (2009: 21).  
140 See Khemani (2009: 22). 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
4.4   Specific features of the FEACC 
4.4.1   Positioning of the FEACC and freedom from interference 
One of the determining factors that can assist in measuring the independence of an 
anti-corruption institution is the position it occupies within the structure of 
government. The FEACC is not legally subsumed under any government office. It is 
established as an independent Federal Government body.141 However, where as 
originally the Commission was free formally from any interference from any person or 
government body in discharging all of its activities,142 currently the revised FEACC 
Establishing Proclamation accords the Prime Minister the power to interfere in areas 
other than the prosecutorial and investigative roles of the Commission.143 The 
justification given for this revision has been that the previous law prevented the 
Prime Minister from giving the Commission general direction and extending support 
in areas other than investigation and prosecution of corruption offences.144 
It is argued that, although according power to the Prime Minister, who is the most 
powerful official in government, to facilitate the work of the Commission may be 
commendable, conferring on him or her the authority to give directions may pose a 
threat to the independence of the Commission. As an independent body that is 
established to oversee the government, the Commission should have as little 
interference as possible in terms of its operations from the executive.145                                       
  
                                                            
141 Article 3(1) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
142 Article 4 of the Repealed Establishing Proclamation.   
143 Article 4 of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
144 See FEACC: Amendment of the Proclamation. 
145 See Meagher (2002: 2).  
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4.4.2   Appointment and removal of executives of the FEACC 
An issue closely related to the independence of an anti-corruption institution is how 
its executive officials are appointed and removed from office. At the higher 
administrative level, the FEACC has two major posts, namely, Commissioner and 
Deputy Commissioner.146 The Commissioner of the FEACC is appointed by the 
House of Peoples’ Representatives upon nomination by the Prime Minister,147 while 
the Deputy Commissioner is appointed directly by the Prime Minister himself.148 
Previously, the only grounds for removal from office were criminal conviction and 
mental and physical illness that hamper performance.149 However, under the revised 
FEACC Establishing Proclamation, violation of code of conduct and manifest 
incompetence and inefficiency are included in the grounds for removal, while 
excluding criminal conviction.150 Finally, the term of office of both the Commissioner 
and Deputy Commissioner is six years, with the possibility of reappointment for 
another term.151  
It has been held that the appointment procedure of the heads of an anti-corruption 
body should be one which recognises that the primary task of the office holder is to 
maintain a check on the executive and, in particular, on the political party in power.152 
The reasoning behind this assertion is that leaving the appointment to the executive 
or the ruling party, will damage the practical effectiveness of and public confidence in 
the institution.   
                                                            
146 Article 10 of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
147 Article 10(1) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
148 Article 10(2) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation.  
149 Articles 10(2) & 12(2) of the  Repealed Establishing Proclamation. 
150 Article 14(2) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation.   
151 Article 14(1) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
152 See Jennett (2007: 3).  
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According to the 2005 Africa Governance Report, the Ethiopian executive branch of 
government has been found to be very corrupt.153 Also, it has been held that the 
FEACC was created mostly to be used as a tool to pursue political rivalries.154  
Hence, the fact that the Prime Minister, who is the head of the ruling party, selects 
the Deputy Commissioner and recommends who should be appointed as 
Commissioner, may prove to be detrimental to the image and effectiveness of the 
FEACC.     
The grounds for removal of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner should 
also be matters of concern. In particular, it is submitted that the ground of manifest 
incompetence and inefficiency is subjective and hence very prone to manipulation. 
This assertion may be reinforced by reference to the removal of Auditor-General 
Lema Argaw by the Prime Minister in 2006, after he released a report showing that 
400 million US dollars were unaccounted for in the Federal Government’s funding 
allocation to regional administrations.155 Although, on the one hand, there is a need 
to remove the leaders of the Commission in situations where they manifestly prove to 
be incompetent or inefficient, on the other hand, there is a pressing reason to make 
sure that the ground of removal is not going to be used as a tool of reprisal by the 
government. 156 This, for example, may happen in a situation where the Commission 
has opted to investigate and possibly prosecute officials whom the government does 
not want to be put behind bars.                       
        
                                                            
153 See Africa Governance Report (2005). 
154 See Dizard et al (2008: 315). 
155 After thirty years of service, the Auditor-General was removed from office in what was seen by 
most as a retaliatory move by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. See Smith (2007: 15). 
156 It has been widely held that the effectiveness of the Commission has been curbed mostly due to 
control and influence by the ruling party (EPRDF). The Commission has been accused also of not 
going after the “big fish”. See Global Integrity Report Ethiopia: Anti-Corruption Agency Integrity 
Indicators Scorecard (2008).       
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4.4.3   Fiscal autonomy and resources of the FEACC 
For the Commission to be effective, the resources apportioned to it should be 
commensurate with the responsibilities and competencies with which it is endowed. 
However, it can be observed that lack of adequate resources has been one of the 
major challenges faced by the FEACC.157   
In Ethiopia, the executive has the mandate to prepare the Federal budget and, when 
approved by Parliament (House of Peoples’ Representatives), to implement the 
same.158 Although the mandate to prepare the annual budget of the Commission lies 
with the Commissioner, the proposed budget has to be submitted to the Prime 
Minister, who in turn submits it to Parliament for approval.159       
As is evident, the Commission neither has the ability to propose the budget directly to 
Parliament, nor is there a legal framework in place that can guarantee its budgetary 
stability.160 Allowing the Commission to put forward its annual budget plan to 
Parliament may require an amendment to the Constitution, which is a lengthy and 
burdensome process.161 Hence, it is submitted, that as the discretion of the Prime 
Minister in deciding the level of funding required for the Commission is unfettered, 
                                                            
157 See Megiso (2007: 9) & FEACC: Annual Report (2008). The Commission has 227 staff and its 
annual budget for the year 2008 has been close to $1.4 million only. Furthermore, among other things, 
the Commission is faced with shortage of office space, vehicles and staff skilled in surveillance and 
intelligence.      
158 Article 77(3) of the Ethiopian Constitution. 
159 Article 12(2)(d) of the  Revised Establishing Proclamation. There is no limitation on the power of 
the Prime Minister as to what he or she is able to do with the budget prepared by the Commissioner.   
160 Though the Commission has been receiving regular funds, it has not been securing the amount it 
requested. See Global Integrity Report Ethiopia: Anti-Corruption Agency Integrity Indicators Scorecard 
(2008). 
161 See Article 105(2) of the Ethiopian Constitution, which provides that the Constitution may be 
amended only “when the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation, in a joint 
session, approve a proposed amendment by a two-thirds majority vote; and when two-thirds of the 
Council of the member States of the Federation approve the proposed amendment by majority votes”.  
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there is a need to put in place a legal framework that guarantees budgetary stability 
for the Commission.162                              
 
4.4.4   Accountability and transparency of the Commission 
The FEACC is accountable only to the Prime Minister.163 The Commissioner submits 
performance and financial reports of the Commission to the Prime Minister.164 This 
accountability arrangement was selected over two other proposed alternatives: for 
the Commission to be accountable to Parliament (House of Peoples’ 
Representatives); or to a committee comprising members drawn from the legislature, 
executive and judiciary.165 The underlying reasons for the appointment of the Prime 
Minister as the person to whom the Commission is responsible includes the time- 
taking nature of decision-making in Parliament and the fact that most corruption 
occurs in the executive departments of government organisations.166 Hence, it was 
concluded that the Commission’s work of investigating and prosecuting cases would 
be enhanced if supported by the Prime Minister’s orders.167 
It is submitted that the argument to choose the Prime Minister as the person to whom 
the Commission is accountable is weak and contradictory. On the one hand, it has 
been conceded that most corruption takes place in the executive and, on the other 
hand, it has been decided to make the Commission responsible to the Prime Minister 
(who is the head of the executive). That may amount to opening the door for 
shielding friends and allies, while oppressing political adversaries at the same time. 
                                                            
162 For example, a law which restricts the discretion of the Prime Minister to reduce the proposed 
budget of the FEACC from what has been approved the previous year (depending on inflation rates) 
can be enacted to ensure the stability of the budget of the Commission.   
163 Article 3(2) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation.  
164 Article 12(2)(i) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation.  
165 Sartet (2004: 9).  
166 Sartet (2004: 9). 
167 Sartet (2004: 9). 
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As emphasised by TI, “in setting the parameters for the establishment of an Anti-
Corruption Agency, a government must ask itself if it is creating something that would 
be acceptable if it were an opposition party”.168 As indicated earlier, it is widely 
contended that the Commission has been created to serve as a pawn of the ruling 
party (EPRDF). Thus, it may be deduced that the accountability arrangement made 
is one that cannot be acceptable for opposition parties or any person who may be 
deemed a target by the government. Therefore, there is compelling reason to shift 
the accountability mechanism to a committee composed of members of the 
legislature, executive and judiciary. This will provide the necessary platform for the 
work of the Commission to be scrutinised by the various arms of government. In 
addition, creating a tripartite committee will bypass the time-taking nature of 
decision-making that was feared if the Commission had been made accountable to 
Parliament.     
The Commission can be also accountable to the public through reporting regularly. In 
this regard, the Commission has been making annual reports and posting them on its 
official website.169                            
      
4.4.5   Major powers and duties of the FEACC 
Amongst others, the FEACC is tasked with the powers and duties to:   
• Combat corruption by creating awareness about its effect and promote ethics 
in the public service and the society in co-operation with relevant bodies;  
• Prevent corruption, in co-operation with relevant bodies, by examining and 
revising methods of work conducive to corrupt practices; 
                                                            
168 Pope (2000: 97). 
169 See FEACC: Annual Report (2008). 
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• Investigate or cause the investigation of alleged serious breaches of codes of 
ethics in government offices and public enterprises, and follow up the taking of 
appropriate measures;     
• Investigate and prosecute or cause the investigation and prosecution of 
alleged perpetration of corruption offences specified in the Criminal Code and 
other laws, where committed by public officials or employees or other public 
offices or enterprises; 
• Inspect, search and seize any property during the process of investigation of 
offences; 
• Summon persons for questioning and receiving testimonies, and order the 
presentation of any evidence from any person or office; 
• Investigate any bank account suspected to contain proceeds of corruption; 
• Freeze and cause the forfeiture of assets and wealth obtained by corruption or 
its equivalent, through court order; 
• Register or cause the registration of the assets and financial interests of public 
officials and employees;     
• Provide for or facilitate the physical and job security protection of witnesses 
and whistle blowers; and 
• Ensure the preparation of or prepare and monitor the implementation of codes 
of ethics for public offices and public enterprises, apart from legislative and 
judicial bodies. 170  
As can be observed from the above rather lengthy list, the Commission is mandated 
to engage in a number of anti-corruption and ethics activities. And in order to 
discharge these far-reaching activities the Commission is divided into six 
                                                            
170 See Article 7 of the Revised Establishing Proclamation for the full details of the powers and duties 
of the Commission.       
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departments: Department of Ethics Education and Public Relations; Department of 
Corruption Prevention; Department of Corruption Investigation; Department of 
Corruption Prosecution; Department of Research Studies and Department of Co-
ordination of Ethics Infrastructures.    
The time during which UNCAC was drafted and adopted coincided more or less with 
the revision of the Ethiopian Penal Code.171 As a result, a number of new provisions 
in the Code were devoted to criminalising acts that constitute corruption offences in 
order to meet international standards.172 This is commendable, because it shows that 
the country is willing and able to implement the obligations it has assumed by 
ratifying an international instrument. Most importantly, it will serve as a stepping 
stone for the Commission to fight more forms of corruptive acts and practices.   
The Commission has not been, however, able to enforce two of its major powers and 
which are essential in fighting corruption, namely, registration of assets and financial 
interests of public officials and employees, and protection of whistleblowers and 
witnesses. Both powers lack enforcing legislative provisions that are required for the 
Commission to exercise them. 
Registration of assets, as discussed in the previous chapter,173 is crucial to facilitate 
the prosecution of public officials under the illicit enrichment offence.174 Although the 
Commission has submitted a draft law on the registration of assets to Parliament, it is 
yet to be adopted.175 Considering that the Commission is ill-equipped when it comes 
to the experts and technology required to reveal complex cases of corruption, it is 
                                                            
171 The 1957 Ethiopian Penal Code was amended in 2004 and became the Ethiopian Criminal Code.   
172 See Mengistu (2009: 7). Some 23 articles are included in the revised Criminal Code to address the 
issue of corruption.    
173 See the discussion under Section 3.2.6 above. 
174 The crime of “unexplained property” is criminalised under Article 419 of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Code (2004).  
175 See Mengistu (2009: 7). 
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imperative to adopt the draft legislation and provide the Commission with the tool to 
facilitate its fight against grand corruption.    
Corruption is clandestine by nature, which makes it hard to detect. Also, it usually 
does not have a victim that can trigger investigation. Whistleblowing not only should 
increase the risk of detection, but can also bolster the chances of successful 
prosecutions by providing the kind of information that can help enforcement 
agencies.176 That makes it crucial to motivate persons to blow the whistle whenever 
they encounter corrupt practices. However, whistleblowers and witnesses need 
protection from retaliation and victimisation by those they expose and help put 
behind bars. International and regional anti-corruption conventions also emphasise 
the need to protect whistleblowers and witnesses.177 Therefore, the Ethiopian 
government has an important role to play in ensuring that citizens exercise their right 
of effective participation in the fight against corruption by giving them adequate legal 
protection, and by passing the law that has been drafted by the FEACC.178           
Another measure which is crucial to prevent corruption is civil asset forfeiture.179 The 
FEACC has the power to demand the forfeiture of assets obtained through corruption 
upon the conviction of a corruption suspect.180 Nevertheless, it does not have the 
mandate to resort to an action against the ill-gotten property (in rem) in the absence 
of a conviction. Corruption offenders may try to take advantage of the inefficiency of 
the Commission (due to lack of required investigative techniques and of sufficient 
                                                            
176 See Hall & Davies (1999: 6). 
177 See Articles 32 & 33 of UNCAC and Article 5(5) of the AU Convention. The Conventions require 
States Parties to adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in 
corruption offences.   
178 See Gebremedhin (2009: 26). The Commission has been faced with the problem of securing 
appropriate witnesses for the investigation and prosecution of alleged corruption offences, because 
witnesses fear reprisal. That necessitated a piece of legislation for the protection of whistleblowers 
and witnesses.    
179 See the discussion under Section 3.2.7 above. 
180 See Article 29 of the Revised Proclamation to Provide for Special Procedure and Rules of 
Evidence on Anti-Corruption Proclamation no. 434/2005.  
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finance) in exposing their corrupt practices and presenting evidence in court that may 
result in their conviction. As a result, criminals may not fear losing the proceeds of 
their corrupt conduct because the Commission has to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt to secure a conviction before proceeding against their property. 
What is more, corruption suspects are absconding from the country with large sums 
of money before getting caught.181 Civil asset forfeiture can be used in these kinds of 
circumstances, because an action can be brought against the property of those 
criminals who fled but left their houses and businesses behind. It is submitted that, 
the Commission should be mandated to resort to civil forfeiture proceedings in an 
effort to enhance its crime preventive role and the recovery of stolen national assets.                        
 
4.4.6   Focus of the FEACC 
Except for those cases that involve grand corruption,182 the Commission has the 
authority to delegate a general investigative power to Federal and Regional 
investigative bodies.183 However, all investigative bodies, with or without delegated 
general investigative power from the Commission, are mandated to commence 
investigation of any alleged or suspected corruption offences falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Commission, provided that they inform the Commission.184 Upon 
receipt of the report, the Commission may investigate the matter itself or cause the 
                                                            
181 See Gebremedhin (2009: 26). It has been maintained that the absence of extradition treaties 
between Ethiopia and other countries have helped corruption suspects to get away.      
182 Article 2(9) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation defines serious corruption offence and not 
grand corruption. However, it can be inferred from (FEACC: Amendment of the Proclamation) that 
grand corruption refers to serious corruption offence. The latter is defined as: “a corruption offence 
involving huge amount of money committed in highly strategic Public Office and Public Enterprise; a 
corruption offence involving a public official; or corruption offences which cause or are capable of 
causing a grave danger to the national sovereignty, economy, security or social life”. It is submitted 
that, the meaning of some of the terms like (huge amount of money, highly strategic, grave danger) is 
highly subjective and may need more clarification. 
183 Article 8(1) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
184 Article 8(2) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
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investigation to be conducted by the reporting body or other organ.185  
In case the Commission fails to act on the report, the organ commencing 
investigation should finish the same and send the result to an organ that is 
competent to initiate prosecution.186 The Commission has further, the authority to 
transfer a matter it has started to investigate to other investigative organs.187  
The delegation power of the Commission also extends to prosecution.188 While the 
Regions may institute corruption offence proceedings in the Regional offices relating 
to subsidies granted by the Federal Government to the Regions, the Commission 
may, however, substitute the Regional anti-corruption office or prosecutor and enter 
into the proceedings at any time.189   
The aforementioned scheme makes it conducive for the Commission to converge its 
scarce resources on corruption offences that have a relatively deep impact on the 
country. The dilemma is that, it may not always be clear for those entities with 
general delegated power to exercise the Commission’s powers, to identify their 
competencies. This problem may ensue because those offences that fall under the 
category “serious corruption offence”, and which should not be delegated generally 
to other law enforcement bodies without being screened by the Commission, are not 
defined clearly. This may lead to situations where the delegated entities may fail to 
report to the Commission and transgress their authority. Transgression of the 
authority of the FEACC, in effect, defy the very purpose for which the Commission 
has been established, which is combating grand corruption in a knowledge-based 
fashion.      
                                                            
185 Article 8(3) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation.  
186 Article 8(4) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
187 Article 8(5) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation.  
188 Article 9(1) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. 
189 Article 9(2) of the Revised Establishing Proclamation. According to Mengistu (2009: 5-6), seven of 
the nine Regions have established their own anti-corruption institutions.  
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4.5   Participation of anti-corruption campaigners  
The involvement of anti-corruption campaigners is most appropriate and preferred in 
the crusade against corruption. These anti-corruption campaigners include civil 
society organisations, media, religious groups and the public at large.  
The FEACC is aware of the significance of the participation of anti-corruption 
campaigners in the fight against corruption. With a view to enhancing the 
participation of the different anti-corruption campaigners, the Commission has 
established the Department for the Co-ordination of Ethics Infrastructures, which is 
duty-bound to liaise between the Commission and the different campaigners and to 
facilitate their partnership.190 In particular, the Department has been seeking the 
involvement of civil society organisations in the common goal to curb corruption and 
impropriety.191 Additionally, the FEACC has been attempting to create close ties with 
religious organisations, especially taking into consideration their indispensable role in 
disseminating anti-corruption education.192 It has been also noted that the FEACC 
has a good relationship with both private and public media, and that among other 
things, it provides them with up-to-date information on the continuing anti-corruption 
campaign.193  
                                                            
190 See Mengistu (2009: 5). 
191 See Gebremedhin (2009: 26). Civil society is generally considered to be weak in Ethiopia, 
especially in the fight against corruption. The major civil society organisations leading the fight against 
corruption in Ethiopia are Transparency Ethiopia (TE) and Initiative Africa (IA). See Business Anti-
Corruption Portal: Ethiopian Private Anti-corruption Initiatives.    
192 See Mengistu (2009: 5). 
193 See Megiso (2007: 6). 
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Major factors that may impede the media and civil society efforts to combat 
corruption are, nonetheless, lack of press freedom194 and the new civil society law in 
Ethiopia.195 These would hinder the ability of the media to air accusations of 
corruption or the ability of the press freely to conduct investigative journalism in an 
unbiased manner.196 The role that can be played by civil society will also be curbed, 
because of the increased interference by the government in their operations. 
Therefore, the eagerness of the FEACC to mobilise the media and the civil society in 
the anti-corruption movement should be reinforced by laws that give these important 
anti-corruption campaigners access to information and freedom of the press, and 
protect them from unnecessary government interference.  
 
4.6   Achievements of the FEACC            
Despite the fact that the TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows that Ethiopia 
has not made much progress in the fight against corruption since the establishment 
of the Commission,197 and the Global Integrity Report of 2008 rated the Commission 
                                                            
194 Although, in principle, freedom of the press and access to information is upheld and guaranteed by 
the Constitution, in reality the situation has reportedly deteriorated in recent years, after the 2005 
elections in Ethiopia. See Business Anti-Corruption Portal: Ethiopian Private Anti-corruption Initiatives.   
 Ethiopia ranks 142nd out of 168 countries in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index. See Reporters 
Without Borders – World Press Freedom Index (2008). The country also ranks 165th out of 195 
countries and rated as “not free”. See Freedom House - Freedom of the Press Index (2009).  In 2006, 
Ethiopia was the third leading jailor of journalists in the world, next to China and Cuba.    
195 Among other things, the law gives government-established agencies broad discretionary power 
over civil society organisations, which would allow strict government control and interference in the 
operation and management of civil society organisations. See Amnesty International Public Statement 
(2008). Despite severe criticism from donors, civil society and foreign governments, the Ethiopian 
Parliament passed the law on 6 January 2009. See World Alliance for Citizen Participation (2009). 
196 See Dizard et al (2008: 315).   
197 TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-
related data in expert surveys carried out by a variety of reputable institutions. It reflects the views of 
businesspeople and analysts from around the world, including experts who are resident in the 
countries evaluated. According to this index, Ethiopia’s ranking from the year 2001 to 2008 has been 
59th/102, 92th/133, 114th/146, 137th/159, 130th/163, 138th/180, and 126th/180 countries respectively. 
See TI: Corruption Perceptions Index (2001-2008). 
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as “weak”,198 sight should not be lost of some of the positive aspects of the work of 
the FEACC. The Commission has distributed more than 80 000 magazines, 68 000 
posters, 355 000 brochures, and 160 000 fliers to educate the citizenry and create 
awareness about corruption in the country.199 
The institution has prosecuted more than 800 corruption cases resulting in over 300 
convictions.200 In one case, twelve senior officials of the Development Bank of 
Ethiopia were arrested in May 2006 and charged with violations of bank policy and 
illegal overseas transfers.201 Additionally, in an endeavour to tackle corruption in the 
areas of land administration and leasing, the Commission has succeeded in securing 
the invalidation of ownership titles of more than 600 000 square metres of urban land 
and the recovery of more than $ 120 million.202  
The Commission is leading the investigation and prosecution of corruption which 
allegedly has been committed in the competitive tendering for the supply of 
telecommunications equipment, and which involved nearly the loss of 200 million US 
dollars.203 Finally, the Commission has been spearheading the investigations and 
prosecutions of a huge gold scam that took place at the Ethiopian National Bank, and 
which has resulted in the Government losing $ 16 million.204 Although the 
prosecution of those who were involved in this matter is not complete, the 
Commission has managed to freeze $ 4.6 million and has seized 81 kg of gold.205  
                                                            
198 See Global Integrity Report Ethiopia: Anti-Corruption Agency Integrity Indicators Scorecard (2008).  
199 See Global Integrity Report (2006). See also FEACC: Annual Report (2008). 
200 See Norwegian Embassy (2009). See also South-South News (2009).   
201 See Business Anti-Corruption Portal - Ethiopia Country Profile (2009). 
202 See Mengistu (2009:4). 
203 See FEACC: Annual Report (2008). See also Addis Fortune (2009). Public tendering has been one 
of the most corruption-prone areas in the country. It has been indicated also that foreign companies 
rank corruption as the single most problematic factor for conducting business in the Ethiopia. See 
Global Competitiveness Report (2008-2009),    
204 See BBC News (2008). A number of the Bank’s employees, other government employees and 
business people were implicated in the case.    
205 See FEACC: Annual Report (2008), 
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The FEACC has made a tremendous contribution to preventing corruption also. It 
has examined the practices and working procedures of almost 100 government 
offices and public enterprises and proposed recommendations and corrective 
measures.206  
The FEACC has received more than 2 000 tips in the period 2008-2009 from the 
public, said tips increasing over time.207 This may be due also to the toll-free hotline 
which has been made available for those who want to make anonymous reports and 
complaints to the FEACC.        
 
4.7   Conclusion 
It has been eight years since Ethiopia chose to establish an institution to spearhead 
the anti-corruption movement in the country. The Commission has been given 
enough power, more or less, to combat corruption by engaging in educational, 
preventive, investigative and prosecutorial activities. And admittedly, although not a 
solution in and of itself, selecting the proper institutional arrangement is the starting 
point towards alleviating the scourge of corruption in the country. However, despite 
its wide-ranging powers, the Commission has not made a noteworthy impact in 
curbing corruption. This may be attributable mostly to its structural flaws, lack of 
independence from political interference and public distrust. Nevertheless, its efforts 
to prevent and combat corruption have improved over time.  
 
  
                                                            
206 See Gebremedhin (2009: 25). However, note should be taken that some of the offices and 
enterprises which the Commission examined and for which corrective measures were proposed, were 
unwilling to apply the recommendations.    
207 See Walta Info (2009). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1   Introduction 
This study has analysed the addition of specialised anti-corruption institutions to 
national anti-corruption campaigns. It further scrutinised the major factors that 
require due consideration to enhance the contribution of these institutions in the 
overall anti-corruption crusade. Central to the study was the assessment of the 
Ethiopian FEACC in terms of the identified factors that improve the effectiveness of 
ACCs or ACAs. What follows is a detailed conclusion and recommendations based 
on the findings of the study.   
 
5.2   Conclusion 
Over the last fifteen years specialised ACCs or ACAs have been considered 
increasingly to be effective instruments in preventing and combating corruption. The 
importance accorded to these institutions can be inferred also from the recognition 
they are given in the different global, regional and sub-regional anti-corruption 
instruments. The preference given to ACCs and ACAs has been motivated mostly by 
the success they have registered in preventing and fighting corruption in states such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore. These specialised anti-corruption institutions can be 
tasked with the educational, preventive, investigative and prosecutorial anti-
corruption functions. And although international standards provide for certain 
thresholds with which these institutions should comply, they do not dictate which 
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model states should adopt. Each state should implement the kind of institutional 
arrangement which best fits its local context.  
Bolstering the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions requires the consideration 
of a number of factors and accompanying best practices and corrective measures. 
These may include factors such as: maintaining their independence and choosing 
the appropriate line-of-accountability mechanisms; the availability of financial and 
human resources at their disposal; their major focus areas; and their relationship to 
other government offices and anti-corruption campaigners. Although these factors do 
not constitute a comprehensive list, observing them and supplementary best 
practices and measures have the potential to enhance the performance of anti-
corruption institutions. 
Ethiopia’s FEACC, which has been in existence for the last eight years, has not 
made a notable impact upon the level of corruption in the country. This may be 
evidenced from the different assessments made by such organisations as TI and 
Global Integrity. 
As to its independence, the Prime Minister has been given the authority to give 
directions to the FEACC. In addition, the appointment procedure and grounds for 
removal of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner have been designed in 
such a way as to pose a great threat to the independence of the Commission. The 
Prime Minister also has an unrestrained power to decide on the budget of the 
Commission. 
The accountability arrangement of the FEACC is not designed to guarantee its 
transparency to a desirable level. Making it accountable to the Prime Minister 
reduces its credibility as well as the level of public trust it requires for its success. 
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The FEACC is endowed with quite a number of powers that it needs to discharge its 
wide-ranging duties. However, its right to exercise two of its major powers – 
registering assets of public employees and protection of witnesses and 
whistleblowers - has remained hampered due to lack of implementing legislation. 
Also, there is a need to add civil forfeiture to its list of mandates to maximise its 
corruption preventive role and efforts to recover money lost to corruption. 
Progress has been made by the FEACC in respect of identifying its focus. especially, 
its mandates to investigate and prosecute corruption practices by allowing other 
investigative and prosecutorial bodies to share its burden. However, clarity is 
required in defining the thresholds which determine when these bodies are allowed 
to step in to investigate and prosecute corruption suspects. 
The FEACC has been trying to solidify its ties with different anti-corruption 
campaigners. But its efforts may be limited because, in particular, the media and civil 
society, which can be located at the heart of the anti-corruption crusade, are faced 
with legal barriers to extending their maximum support to what the Commission is 
endeavouring to achieve. 
The FEACC has examined the practices and working procedures of a large number 
of government offices and public enterprises, and has proposed corrective measures 
for implementation. But, some of the offices and enterprises for which the 
recommendations were made were reluctant to carry out the proposed corrective 
measures. This impedes the corruption preventive role of the Commission, 
especially, by undermining its effort to seal loopholes that are conducive for corrupt 
practices.  
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Corruption suspects have been absconding from the country before getting caught 
and are taking shield in countries with which Ethiopia does not have extradition 
treaties. This is detrimental, especially, to the preventive role of the FEACC.  It sends 
the message to potential corruption offenders that they can get away with their 
criminal act by making arrangements to flee the country to haven countries.          
Finally, as a Federal Government body, the jurisdiction and activities of the FEACC is 
limited to mostly public officials and employees of the Federal Government. The 
Regional States have the power to establish their own anti-corruption institutions. 
The Commission can institute proceedings in the Regional offices only where 
subsidies are granted by the Federal Government to the Regions. Therefore, the 
formal reach of the Commission to prevent and fight corruption in the country is very 
restricted.   
 
5.3   Recommendations 
For the FEACC to maintain its operational independence, the Prime Minister should 
not have the power to give directions to the Commission of his or her own motion. 
The Prime Minister’s involvement in the work of the Commission should be limited to 
the extent that he or she is extending support requested by the Commission to 
facilitate and execute its mandate. 
In order to ensure the independence of the FEACC, it is necessary for the public to 
be involved in the selection of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. This 
can be done by inviting nominations from the public after publication of clear criteria 
pertaining to the kind of persons required for the posts. The nominations can then be 
presented to Parliament (House of Peoples’ Representatives), which will shortlist the 
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nominees it has found suitable and submit these to the Prime Minister for 
endorsement. Nominees can be drawn from government offices or interest groups 
such as civil society organisations and professionals (such as chartered accountants 
or lawyers and even persons from the private sector). It is important to assess 
whether the nominees have personal integrity and can be trusted with the crucial 
task of leading the Commission. 
The final decision to remove the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner should lie 
with Parliament rather than the Prime Minister. This will significantly reduce, the 
possibility of grounds for removal – especially incompetence and inefficiency – being 
used as a tool by the executive to get rid of proactive and independent executives of 
the Commission who might decide to pursue cases against those who are closely 
tied to the Government.  
The Commission should have a sound and stable financial base in order to be in a 
position to draw up and pursue its long term plans. It requires this financial base in 
order to prevent and fight a culture of corruption which has been entrenched in 
Ethiopian society for many years. For this reason, the legislature should pass a law 
which restricts the power of the Prime Minister to determine the budget of the 
Commission. 
The accountability line should shift from the Prime Minister to a committee composed 
of members of the legislature, executive and judiciary. It is in the interests of 
accountability for the Commission to report through a committee comprised of 
members of all arms of government rather than through an individual. This can better 
enhance the transparency of the work of the Commission and guarantee that the 
FEACC is there to serve the interests of the nation as a whole and not the privileged 
few. 
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The legislature should adopt the draft proclamations that have been prepared by the 
FEACC on protection of whistleblowers and witnesses, and on registration of assets 
of public employees. Both laws, if implemented, have the ability to facilitate the 
cumbersome task of securing successful prosecution of corruption cases. 
Moreover, the FEACC should be given the mandate to exercise one of the most well 
known tools in the prevention of corruption – a civil asset forfeiture scheme. Apart 
from prevention, this would help in restoring money lost to corruption back to the 
coffers of government. 
The threshold provided to determine the competencies of other investigative and 
prosecutorial bodies that exercise the powers of the FEACC in a delegated capacity 
should be polished and made clear. This would avoid the controversies and dangers 
that may be posed as a result of such bodies intruding upon the competencies of the 
Commission. 
The FEACC should be able to report to Parliament, in situations where the 
recommendations made by the Commission to reduce the likelihood of corrupt 
practices are not adhered to by government offices and public enterprises. In this 
way, those that are unjustifiably reluctant to implement the recommendations of the 
Commission can be called by Parliament to account for their actions.     
As things stand, the FEACC is very short on finance and skilled staff. This means 
that it needs all the help it can get from other anti-corruption campaigners, such as 
civil society and the media. However, in order for civil society and the media to stand 
side by side with the Commission and provide further impetus to the fight against 
corruption, the legislature should first provide the legal framework which is needed to 
ensure press freedom and to avoid unnecessary operational interference from the 
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Government. Most importantly, there is a need to make sure that the law is adhered 
to in practice. 
If corruption is to be prevented and fought nationwide, there is an equally pressing 
need to strengthen the Regional anti-corruption institutions. Also, in order to reach 
their common goal, which is reducing the scourge of corruption in Ethiopia, the 
FEACC and the Regional Anti-Corruption institutions should work closely and assist 
each other to the highest extent possible. 
Such government offices as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice 
should make possible the extradition of persons who have committed corruption 
offences by concluding the required treaties and building good international co-
operative relations with other countries. The FEACC should also endeavour to 
receive all the assistance it can from the international community – mostly states and 
NGOs - in all other areas that can facilitate the work of the Commission.   
Word Count 12 072  (excluding bibliography, footnotes, table of 
contents, acknowledgement, declaration and cover page.) 
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